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So You Want to Find a Transitional House for
Sexually Violent Persons: An Account of
Political Failure
Stan Stojkovic
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Mary Ann Farkas
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Abstract
Many states passed legislation in the 1990s to address the problem of violent sex offenders. While academic
inquiries into the nature and extent of sexual offending have revealed some interesting findings, very little is
known regarding how communities address the issue of managing violent sex offenders. This account
documents how the state of Wisconsin attempted to manage violent sex offenders once released from prison
and civilly committed under a sexually violent person statute. It chronicles the experience of a committee
charged with locating possible sites for a facility for sexual predators under supervised release to the
community. In addition, this account shows the problematic nature of implementing a state statute in a large

county and identifies barriers inherent to this process. The concept of political failure is introduced to describe
why sex offender legislation is difficult to implement.
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Introduction
Few other criminals ignite the anger, fear, and condemnation of the public as sex offenders. Viewed as
qualitatively different from other types of offenders, they are believed to be a homogeneous group specializing
in sex crimes exclusively (Palermo & Farkas, 2001). Research findings, however, demonstrate that like other
offenders, sex offenders tend to be more versatile in their criminal behavior (Harris, Smallbone, Dennison, &
Knight, 2009; Simon, 2000). According to Simon (2000), researchers who measure the versatility of offending are
in agreement that sex offenses are single or infrequent crimes that often are embedded in an extensive criminal
history of property and violent crime.
Sex offenders are also presumed to be more dangerous offenders highly likely to repeat their crimes and more
likely to recidivate than other types of criminal offenders, even though there is no supporting empirical evidence
(Palermo & Farkas, 2001). The reality is that recidivism rates for sex offenders are relatively low. Sample and
Bray (2003) contend that sex offenders have one of the lowest re-arrest rates for any crime and for the same
original crime than do most other offenders. A comprehensive meta-analysis of 61 studies with a combined
sample of 28,972 sex offenders found an overall sex offense recidivism rate of 13.4% in an average follow-up
period of 4 to 5 years (Hanson & Bussiere, 1998). A later meta-analysis of sex offender recidivism also confirmed
a lower recidivism rate of 12% among the 9,454 sex offenders in the 43 studies in the sample (Hanson et al.,
2002).
Based on public assumptions, convicted sex offenders are subjected to intensive measures of legal and social
controls (Miethe, Olson, & Mitchell, 2006). Numerous sex offender laws and policies have been enacted that
apply to all sex offenders as a distinct group regardless of the type of sex crime and their likelihood to reoffend.
Universal and selective crime policies and initiatives targeting convicted sex offenders have been instituted with
little opposition or challenges from individuals and groups including legislators, political figures, criminal justice
officials, and the general public.
In terms of criminal justice strategies, legislation at the county, state, and federal levels represents a broad
spectrum of alternatives and options in limiting the movements and actions of sex offenders. This has taken the
most notable form under the rubric of sex offender registration and community notification laws, such as the
Jacob Wetterling Act, passed by the U.S. Congress in 1994 and then amended in 1996 and known as “Megan’s
Law.” Under these pieces of legislation, states are required to post information regarding sex offenders on
public websites and notify the public about sex offenders in their communities. The Adam Walsh Act, passed in
2006 (Adam Walsh Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 2006) offered guidelines for states to follow
in the registration of sex offenders, and in some states, residency restrictions are intended to constrain where
convicted sex offenders can live and sometimes work.
The fervor with which political bodies have advocated even more restrictive laws is unparalleled (Palermo &
Farkas, 2001). As a unique response to this fear of sex offenders, 20 states have passed Sexually Violent Persons
(SVP) laws that allow for the commitment postincarceration of a class of sex offenders to a specialized mental
health facility for an indeterminate period (Deming, 2008). The laws require a periodic evaluation as to whether
the sex offenders committed as SVPs are now safe to be released to a lesser level of restriction (Lacoursiere,
2003). The SVP law has raised interesting questions regarding the political processes in place to create

legislation to address the incapacitation of sex offenders and how the public’s attitude may influence the
application of laws.
A paucity of research has investigated how such laws designed to manage sex offenders actually become laws in
practice (Terry, 2007). In addition, we know even less about the processes of implementation of sex offender
laws. Because how the law is implemented is so critical to the law’s effectiveness, it is important to examine
how laws designed to manage sex offenders in the community actually achieve that objective. Many of these
laws have been endorsed without the benefit of empirical research as to their effectiveness. The net result is the
efficacy of SVP legislation in the first place (Levenson, Letourneau, Armstrong, & Zgoba, 2010). While Terry
(2006) questions the value of SVP legislation on legal and treatment grounds, this account questions such laws
at the implementation level and ultimately views such failure of implementation as an example of political
failure akin to the sexual psychopath laws of the 1930s (Terry, 2006). In addition, it is not clear what series of
strategies would be the most effective in managing serious sex offenders in the community (Zgoba, Levenson, &
McKee, 2009) with the attendant problems of finding adequate housing, harassment of sex offenders, and
difficulties adjusting to the label of sex offender (Tewksbury & Lees, 2006; Zevitz & Farkas, 2000). Moreover,
what role does the community play in the supervision of SVP’s, and how do agencies responsible for the
management of these offenders gain the necessary trust for such an effort to exist in a community?
This article represents an account of the implementation of a law designed to enhance the supervision of a class
of sexually violent offenders in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. It chronicles the experiences of a committee, the Sexually
Violent Persons Transitional Siting Advisory Committee (hereafter referred to as the SVP Siting Committee)
appointed by the Governor to expedite the law’s implementation.
This account highlights the difficulties in implementing an SVP community management plan in light of the
uncertainty and lack of credible knowledge on how best to accomplish such a task (Furby, Weinrott, &
Blackshaw, 1989). Most importantly, this account shows that even if legislative action and authority exist to
address the management of a problematical population in the community, such as SVPs, this does not
necessarily translate into community acceptance. Without the support of key community constituents and
political leaders, such an effort is doomed to fail. In this account, we will show that even though there was
widespread legislative support for the implementation of a transitional house for SVPs in the community, and a
clear plan on supervised release was developed, the level of support needed to succeed was never realized at
the community level, and as such, the implementation of key elements of the law that required community
supervision and transitional placement was not possible.
The article begins with a description of the Sexually Violent Persons law (Act 980) and the 2003 Act 187
mandating the formation of a committee to locate transitional housing for the SVPs released from civil
commitment. We chronicle the committee deliberations, communications and actions, public hearings, and
news conferences to identify the barriers to finding suitable housing for sex offenders confronted by committee
members throughout the implementation process and the strategies instituted to surmount these obstacles.
Next an analysis of what was learnt from the implementation of this law and the experiences of the committee
is presented including a discussion on why it was not possible to find adequate housing for sex offenders in the
community. Finally, the ramifications and implications of this conclusion are considered as an example of
political failure at two levels: private or market failure and government failure. Possible strategies to enhance
the supervision of the SVPs, to increase their safe reintegration into the community, and to mediate the fear and
hostility of community residents are explored for use by future siting committees.
Qualitative data were gathered to write this account chronicling 7 months of weekly and monthly logs and
transcripts of committee meetings, communique among various members of the SVP Siting Committee,
communique between the SVP committee and political leaders, the media, business leaders, realtors and public

representatives, and official committee reports. An analysis of radio, TV, and print media coverage was
conducted to determine the focus and perspective relayed to their audience. Transcripts of telephone calls and
copies of e-mails from citizens were also analyzed. Another source of data was comment sheets filled out by
community members at two public hearings.

The Sexually Violent Persons Act (Chapter 980)
Purpose and scope of the law
Twenty states have attempted to address a group of the most problematical sex offenders through the passage
of SVP legislation (Deming, 2008).1 Wisconsin had developed such a law in 1994 and amended it in 2004 to
provide greater control and supervision of offenders who would ultimately be deemed “not dangerous” and fit
for return to the community.2 The legislation was passed as a way to address the release of serious sex
offenders who had completed their criminal sentences. Operating under the rubric of “public safety,” some
state legislators pushed through the legislature Act 980, a law specifically designed to address the management
of serious and violent sex offenders as a postincarceration strategy predicated on the use of the civil system as a
mechanism to institutionalize those offenders deemed to pose the greatest threat to the community and in
need of some form of treatment due to their sexually violent proclivities.3 Under the 980 statute, the offender is
committed under a civil commitment procedure, viewed as a “patient,” not an inmate, the final commitment
decision and release is controlled by the courts, and the person is labeled as a “sexually violent person,” not a
“sexual predator.”
The period of confinement is indefinite, however the commitment procedure has full procedural safeguards
analogous to a criminal trial, is composed of periodic review of commitments, the option of community
placement is possible, and the intent is to address the high risk sex offenders. Moreover, the state has to prove
(a) that the person had been convicted, adjudicated delinquent, or found not guilty by reason of mental disease
for a sexually violent offense; (b) at the time of petition for a probable cause hearing the offender was within 90
days of discharge from a correctional facility; (c) the offender has a mental disorder, or in the words of the 980
statute has a “congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes a
person to engage in acts of sexual violence”; and (d) due to this disorder is “more likely than not to engage in
acts of sexual violence” (Watters, 2009).
The legal authority for the 980 law was based on the Supreme Court cases of Kansas v. Hendricks (1997)
and Kansas v. Crane (2002) that emphasized the importance of the nexus between a mental disorder and
dangerousness and the offender having “serious difficulty in controlling behavior.”4 If the state could not show
this connection and subsequent attempts to “treat” the offender as part of a civil commitment procedure, the
legal threshold could not be met, even though the Supreme court had ruled that such a connection was no
longer necessary. Moreover, the state knew from the inception of the law in 1994 that there would be many
legal challenges to the 980 statute, but it had withstood these challenges due to the emphasis on treatment of
offenders while institutionalized under civil procedures and the state’s long-term commitment to releasing
those offenders who were deemed not dangerous and determined by a court to be prepared for supervisory
release in the community.

Challenges to Act 980
A primary objection to SVP laws is they create a justification of postincarceration civil commitment under the
auspices of a mental disease or defect and thereby may release the offender from taking responsibility for
his/her actions. Labeling sex offenders as SVPs may provide these individuals with an excuse for giving into their
sexual urges (Winick, 2003). Moreover, such laws may impede change and reinforce antisocial sexual behavior
(Winick, 2003). The intent of the laws is also criticized as confining sex offenders as long as possible rather than
treating and releasing them as soon as possible (Winick, 2003). The state, however, also knew that if it did not

release people to the community consistent with its treatment efforts, questions would remain as to whether
the civil commitment process was being used as another form of punishment, or in the words of Terry (2006),
was simply pretextual. The state of Wisconsin did have a number of SVPs who were deemed appropriate for
community release and ordered released by a court, but had no place to house these individuals within some
communities. The lack of housing options for SVPs became a significant issue in 2004 and new legislation was
passed to address this concern.

2003 ACT 187
The Wisconsin Legislature enacted 2003 Act 187 on April 7, 2004, with the express intent to renumber Chapter
980 (Sexually Violent Person Commitments law) and to create definitions of a SVP and criteria for supervised
release of persons defined under the chapter. The law authorized the construction of a new facility or
renovation of an existing facility to house SVPs in transitional housing with the final outcome of living
independently in the community if deemed no longer dangerous by a court. The relevance of this new legislation
was an attempt by the state legislature to address a growing concern for the placement of SVPs in the largest
and most diverse and heterogonous community in the state.5 The city of Milwaukee had experienced some very
difficult cases regarding the placement of SVPs imposed by the state with very little input from citizens and
elected officials. This raised the awareness of city residents that the state was attempting to address the issue of
sexually violent offenders by placing some offenders within the city without their knowledge or consent.

SVP Transitional Siting Advisory Committee Under 2003 Act 187
Charge of the committee
The passage of 2003 Act 187 created a committee “to make recommendations regarding the location of a facility
for the treatment of sexual predators” in Milwaukee County. Specifically, this committee was to provide the
Department of Health and Family Services (DHFS) and the Department of Corrections (DOC) “at least three
specific locations that the committee determines are appropriate for the placement of (a) facility no later than
December 31, 2004.” To implement the new law in this community, the state enlisted a committee of 15
members for the SVP Transitional Siting Advisory Committee, all of whom were appointed under the authority
of the governor. One of the authors was appointed as a member to serve on the committee.6 One of the authors
was elected chair of the committee, a position that seemed logical as he was beholden to no one but the
governor and could stave off much of the political heat that was sure to follow given the committee’s charge.7 In
addition, the committee was staffed by representatives of the Department of Health and Human Services, a
state agency, along with the DOC, charged with seeing that supervised community release was made possible
and enhanced through the selection of a house for offenders to reside in the community.
The first formal meeting of the committee occurred on October 19, 2004, and thereafter on a weekly basis
through May 24, 2005, to pursue the charge mandated by the 2003 Act 187. One of the authors organized
meetings for the committee, compiled notes and transcripts of public hearings, offered testimony to members
of the judiciary, kept the state supreme court aware of the committee’s meetings and deliberations, and served
as the public spokesperson for the committee. Over the course of 7 months, he worked with committee
members and committee staff to identify properties within the county suitable for the placement of a home for
sexually violent offenders.8
In addition, the committee spent many hours, during the deliberate processes of meetings and traveling
throughout Milwaukee County, searching for locations that would meet the minimum criteria for the location of
a facility to house SVPs deemed appropriate for community supervision.

Committee Meetings, Deliberations, and Public Hearings
The search for possible locations
A review of 2003 Act 187 identified the following selection criteria for the sites to house SVPs: community
safety, proximity to sensitive locations, ability to make the facility secure, accessibility to treatment for the
persons living in the facility, and availability of tax incentives to a community to locate the facility within its
jurisdiction. In addition, the proximity of the placement must be considered to all of the following: residences of
persons on whom sex offender notification bulletin has been issued by law enforcement agencies and facilities
for children that the committee was aware of and any residential subdivisions.
In addition to these statutorily defined criteria, the committee included the following criteria: the facility must
be located at least 1,000 feet from any facility for children, located at least 1,000 feet from any other sensitive
area (nursing homes, community-based residential facilities, disabled centers, and community centers), with a
special focus given to light industrial areas, and the seller must be willing to sell or lease the property for the
purposes that were intended by Act 187.9 The inclusion of this criterion made the committee’s work more
difficult, as the city of Milwaukee was so large and densely populated. In large urban areas, like the city of
Milwaukee, finding a location that was more than 1,000 feet from selected facilities was going to be challenging,
yet not impossible.
Moreover, the DHFS recommended that the parcel be of adequate size to accommodate the equivalent of a
single story four-unit apartment building with parking for 3 to 4 vehicles, the site must be environmentally clean,
the site must be appropriate for residence, the site must meet all applicable zoning requirements, and the
location must be in an area maximizing community safety. The committee considered a property viable if it met
these criteria, and it was feasible to build a facility if needed, and a private property owner was willing to sell the
property for the purposes intended by 2003 Act 187 and would be willing to go public with this interest to sell
the property to the state.
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) was utilized to produce a series of maps, which identified properties
within the county and the committee was then able to divide the county into quadrants to identify locations. In
addition, the DOC provided information on the locations of the more than 1,000 sex offenders who were on
active supervision within the county and their zip code locations. These offenders, as well as those who were sex
offenders but no longer supervised, totaled more than 1,600 persons within the county. Moreover, the
committee received from the local police department Uniform Crime data for the city for use in its deliberations.
Realtor services in the county were also consulted to find suitable locations consistent with the committee’s
criteria. Out of 44 realtors contacted in the community, only one responded and agreed to assist the committee.
This realtor did provide a property his company was interested in leasing to the state for the purposes expressed
in 2003 Act 187, and it did become one of the final six properties that the committee decided to forward for
public review and consideration at its second public hearing. Splitting up the county into quadrants and using
real estate websites and commercial real estate listings, committee members attempted to find locations that
would be suitable for the placement of a facility consistent with the committee’s criteria.

Public hearings
The committee was required by 2003 Act 187 to hold at least two public hearings to receive input on possible
locations to house sexually violent offenders on supervised release. At the first public hearing held on November
22, 2004, only two citizens attended and spoke. Their comments were generally supportive and encouraging of
the committee’s work. Three public officials also spoke at the public hearing. The first was the Milwaukee
County Sheriff and the second was the Mayor of Milwaukee, both of whom expressed vigorous opposition to the
location of any site within the city or county to house sexually violent offenders. The Sheriff stated,

I will not be part of any agreement that places a violent predator or a facility to house them in any
neighborhood where the residents themselves do not agree to have them.
This was read from a written statement that was then distributed to media outlets throughout the city. The
Mayor stated,
I think we have to separate them as much as possible . . . They have to be isolated. I am more concerned
about the innocent kids and women of the community than these people.
The committee received these statements with surprise and disappointment as the Sheriff and Mayor had
representatives on the committee, consistent with statutory requirements. The comments by the Sheriff and
Mayor represented a view that was to be voiced by other political leader as the committee continued its work.
The third public official to speak was the Milwaukee County District Attorney who spoke of the common good
and community protection achieved when the most serious sex offenders in the state are committed under
Chapter 980, rather than being released into the community after serving their prison terms with little or no
supervision. Although his office had opposed supervised release in all such cases, the District Attorney expressed
concern that if the committee did not succeed in finding a place for individuals ordered released by the courts,
then the entire statute could be at risk of being declared unconstitutional. That in turn could result in hundreds
of the worst sex offenders in the state being released back into the community without any treatment or
supervision.

The list of potential properties
In December 2004, the committee finalized a list of potential locations with little or no assistance from the
realtor community, no support from political leaders, and limited information from the public. Nevertheless, the
committee’s time-consuming and concerted efforts yielded only 20 potential addresses for further
consideration.10 Within the criteria specifications for building selection, the committee rank ordered the
properties based on the criteria and individual assessments of the members. In addition, there was constant
contact with property owners and local governments regarding the properties.
Of the 20 properties, 17 were in the city, and all but 4 properties were owned by private property owners. To
ensure the properties remained “viable,” property owners were conferred with about any continued interest in
selling their properties given that pressure was likely to come from others not to sell to the state for the
purposes outlined in 2003 Act 187.11
Private conversations with property owners over the next 2 months began with the hope of solidifying their
interest in keeping their properties under consideration. One of the authors and the District Attorney’s
representative worked with property owners to discuss issues and answer any questions about the committee
and its charge. Some property owners could not be found or did not return phone calls. In addition, no one
representing governmental properties responded initially to queries.12
As the committee moved forward, it became apparent that maintaining the original list of 20 properties would
be difficult. In fact, through committee deliberations and conversations with property owners, the committee
had winnowed its list to 12 remaining properties.13
Deliberations by the committee and conversations with private property owners further decreased the list.
Finally, six properties were still considered appropriate locations and after several visits, committee members
voted to keep all six under consideration. A time and date was chosen for the second public hearing. To
announce the six locations, the committee held a press conference on March 8, 2005, to inform the public about
the processes used by the committee in determining the six locations and to encourage attendance at the
second public hearing.

Public and media response to press conference
Prior to the second public hearing, individual committee members received a number of letters, e-mails, and
phone calls expressing disapproval with the six locations. In particular, the Chair received two letters from the
County Executive expressing his strong disapproval of county land being considered for the placement of
sexually violent offenders, and that
“In no other county (has) the state attempted to put the burden of placement on county government,”
and that ultimately it was the state’s responsibility to place these offenders, not the county.
Similar views were offered in writing and verbally by residents of smaller communities within the county and
their political leaders. Our analysis revealed that most radio, TV, and print media coverage focused on the
understandable fear expressed by community members faced with a potential location in their neighborhood.
The committee chair received 198 calls and e-mails from angry citizens blaming and accusing the committee of
everything from incompetence to political corruption. Some callers suggested that the committee, and
specifically the Chair, was a political “hack” for the governor, even though he never communicated with the
governor during the entire deliberative process. However, public pressure was not just reserved for the
committee. Of the six remaining properties, private citizens owned four, and the pressure placed on these
owners and the tactics used by elected officials and citizens to get them to retract their properties was
overwhelming and offensive in some cases.
In one case, a city alderman threatened an owner of a convenience store chain that the city would do no more
business with the chain if they agreed to sell their property to the state, and even boasted about it in the local
newspaper. The alderman stated in a local newspaper
Let’s just say they (property owner) have other businesses coming before the city . . . It wouldn’t have
behooved their interests to come in and try to push sexual deviants down the throats of residents.
(Nunnally & Johnson, 2005, pp. 1-5).
The Chair received a letter from a local attorney requesting a public retraction regarding some statements he
made concerning how public officials were addressing the issue of housing for SVPs. In addition, in this same
letter, he was chided for alleged harsh treatment of the County Executive.

Second public hearing
It was within this heated context that the committee held its second public hearing at the State Fairgrounds in
the county. By the time the hearing was held, the committee only had government properties to consider as
possible locations, and even those locations were tenuous given that the County Executive had unequivocally
stated that county land would not be considered for the purposes under 2003 Act 187. Given this turn of events,
the committee considered canceling the hearing, but it was decided that the importance of receiving public
input outweighed the short list of remaining addresses, and in addition, the hearing provided the potential for
receiving constructive suggestions for new locations.
The second public hearing was attended by more than 1,100 people and was considered the largest public
hearing held in the history of Milwaukee County. Ninety-two people registered to speak, each being given 2 min
to present their views. Before the testimony began, the Chair laid down some ground rules and suggested that
while the committee was very interested in hearing views regarding the six proposed sites, the committee also
wanted to hear from the public regarding other potential sites for committee deliberation. Over the course of
the testimony, most of which was negative and condemning of the committee (sometimes including personal
attacks singling out members), not much constructive feedback and assistance was received. One comment was
made by a citizen from a local community being considered as a possible site for the house. He stated,

The day you build a home for sex offenders in Franklin, Wisconsin, I will lay my body down to stop the
bulldozers from working and you will have to arrest me.
In response to this statement, the district attorney commented that it was not wise to state to the district
attorney of the county in which he resided that he was going to break the law because he would definitely go to
jail if he broke the law.
Many speakers made emotional appeals. Three speakers talked about the importance of the committee’s work
to the community and encouraged support and offered other potential locations. In addition, some political
leaders stood up to express their views and even suggested further assistance to the committee to fulfill its
charge. A state representative stated “We need to give them the resources they need to do their job.”
Statements similar to this one were made in the context that to date the committee had “gotten it wrong” and
needed assistance to do the job in the right way. Comment sheets were provided for speakers to offer written
statements. These comment sheets yielded no new potential sites for the committee to review and consider.14
Subsequent to the second public hearing, the committee decided to continue to deliberate and consider its
options. Particularly discouraging was the lack of support by political officials (except, notably, the District
Attorney), and the oftentimes contradictory behaviors of elected leaders, many of whom were initial
proponents of the 980 legislation and 2003 Act 187, but now walked away from the legislation and the
committee. Many who criticized the committee had representatives on the committee who actively pursued the
fulfillment of its charge. The committee needed greater support from elected officials. Even if additional
addresses were to be found, without the support of community and political leaders the entire process,
complete with intense public pressures on property owners, would recur with similar results.
Recognizing the futility of engaging in such a process again, and in consideration of some of the salient issues
learned from the second public hearing, the committee on April 5, 2005, voted that further consideration should
not be given to the two remaining county properties, and that for the committee to continue its work, it would
require additional staff resources and above all, political support. A unanimous motion was passed instructing
the Chair to create a letter to be sent to all political leaders in the county. The letter would request a simple
pledge of support, but also asked that anyone capable of providing additional resources do so, to allow the
committee to fulfill its charge of finding a minimum of three locations to house SVPs under supervised release.
This letter, dated April 15, 2005, then requested that elected officials work with the committee to educate
constituencies about the negative potential outcome if the 980 statute was deemed unconstitutional in
implementation and the unsafe environment that could result for all members of the community.
It should be noted that at this point there were discussions among members about discontinuing our work due
to what were viewed as insurmountable barriers to fulfilling our charge. The committee was getting tired and
frustrated in its inability to find suitable housing options. The law enforcement representatives on the
committee (two police chiefs and the district attorney) sought the dissolution of the committee. The district
attorney stated,
Does anyone really think we can continue after the public hearing last night? We have no option but to
suspend committee deliberations.
The committee ultimately concluded, however, that it could not ignore the very public pledges of assistance
made by political leaders at the second public hearing. If assistance was forthcoming then we could not in good
conscience cease our efforts, given our perception of the very serious public safety issues associated with the
committee’s charge.

The Chair was therefore instructed to give elected officials 30 days to respond to the letter. The letter was sent
to 128 public officials, including municipal, city, county, and state officials. The committee met on May 10, 2005,
to discuss the responses.
Two County Supervisors informed the committee that the county board had voted 14-5 to seek changes in the
extant 980 statute to allow for the placement of sexually violent offenders in other counties in the state.15 This
letter was followed up by a letter dated May 17, 2005, from the County Executive who supported the county
board’s resolution and reaffirmed his early position that no county lands would be considered for the purposes
of housing sexually violent offenders supervised under the 980 statute within the county. Another letter was
also received from the mayor of a small community in the county stating that the committee has not been
“empowered by the Wisconsin State Legislature to engage in policy-making initiatives,” and hence our request
for additional resources and support were not within our jurisdictional authority, and thus he would not
recommend any action on the part of the common council of the city to support the committee.
Notably, the Chair did receive three letters pledging support, one from the secretary of DHFS who did offer to
the “committee . . . the necessary support to meet its charge” in a letter dated May 9, 2005. The second letter
was from the President of the City Common Council supporting the committee’s work and indicating that he
would work with the committee to educate his constituents about the importance of the 980 law, but that he
was “unable to assist . . . with your first two requests regarding additional resources and staffing for the
committee.” The final letter was from a mayor of another small community in the county expressing that one of
their alderpersons would be interested in being a “liaison between the Committee and his city.”
The committee received no letters of support or assistance from the public officials who had spoken at the
second public hearing. The lack of political leadership and support was a recurring theme during the
committee’s 7 months of work. The committee’s efforts were significant, but there was no reason to believe
that further committee work would yield any locations for further consideration. The committee anguished over
the fact that it could not meet its charge of securing at least three locations for consideration as houses to hold
SVPs on supervised release, yet also understood the difficult charge it was given. The committee did believe that
locations to house sexually violent offenders under supervision within the county could be found; however,
unless an attempt was made to address the barriers faced by the committee, it was not likely that locations to
house sexually violent offenders placed on supervision would ever be found.

Findings
Barriers to Completing Charge
The following recurrent themes were identified from the qualitative data as barriers to fulfilling the committee’s
charge as presented in 2003 Act 187: (a) lack of public support, (b) lack of political support, (c) lack of resources,
(d) and the vagueness of 2003 Act 187 itself.

Lack of Public Support
The community at large, with few exceptions, did not support the portion of the law that allowed for the
supervised release of Chapter 980 offenders, at least insofar as that section allowed placement of these
individuals in Milwaukee County. This was perceived as a barrier because members of the community were most
familiar with properties within the county, and most properties in the county were owned by private citizens as
opposed to governmental entities. Therefore, community members would be in the best position to come
forward with potential locations.
When the committee actively sought community input and suggestions for placement locations using an initial
press release, press conference, and then the first public hearing, however, fewer than five members of the

public responded. When the committee turned to the members of the community who are paid for locating
properties for sale using an Request for Proposal (RFP) and direct contacts with real estate agents and
organizations, only one real estate agent responded with a potential location.
The public reaction after the potential addresses were released was not supportive. Community members
reacted with fear and anger. The committee cared very much about this reaction, and recognized the reason for
the fear and anger—after all, the people eligible for supervised release were by definition some of the worst sex
offenders in the state. It is also true, however, that Chapter 980 had been very successful in protecting the
public, and that the state had a demonstrable plan to effectively supervise offenders in the community. The
supervised release of a very small percentage of the Chapter 980 offenders in other parts of the State had been
a success, with no new sexually violent crimes convictions by those being monitored (Watters, 2009).16
Through media portrayals, interviews, a news conference, and public hearings to relay the relevance and
importance of the 980 statute to community safety, the Chair described Chapter 980 as a civil commitment
procedure, not a criminal matter, a process predicated on treatment, not punishment, and the goal of the
process being transition from secure civil confinement to interim housing and finally to independent living.
Despite these efforts there was no apparent acceptance that the individuals eligible for supervised release had
worked hard for many years in treatment programs to earn the recommendation of qualified doctors that they
be allowed to transition into the community. There was little or no acknowledgment that if nothing was done to
find possible locations to house sexually violent offenders on supervised release, there was a possibility that the
county could be ordered to build a facility by a court. Worse, there was little recognition that without a
successful placement location, the statute could be declared unconstitutional thereby releasing all of the 980
patients into local communities with little or no supervision and no intensive treatment.17 The committee did
not have a budget to mount a true campaign to disseminate this message, nor was communication of this
message an enumerated goal (according to the statute) for the committee.

Lack of Political Support
The public reaction was communicated in no uncertain terms to the politicians representing the citizenry. The
politicians’ reactions were at best inaction and denial that the county and its citizens through their elected
officials had to address how sexually violent offenders were going to be supervised in the county. At worst, the
reaction of public officials included attacks on the committee and the exertion of heavy pressure on private
property owners whose locations were under consideration by the committee.
Previous attempts to place a SVP on supervised release in Milwaukee county had included a community-based
committee initiative and a committee appointed by a local judge headed by an appointed Special Master. These
committees proceeded in very different ways to attempt to find a location, with the community-based initiative
holding open hearings and openly deliberating addresses or locations and the judicially created committee
conducting its search for addresses in closed sessions. Neither approach yielded a viable placement. It was
therefore acknowledged early on in this committee’s work that the support of public officials in the county was
absolutely necessary to its work.
Importantly, 2003 Act 187 dictated that specific elected officials in the county sit on the committee itself, or
assign designees to the committee. It was presumed that these public officials would support the work of the
committee and attempt to assist in disseminating the message that Chapter 980 serves the common good and
should be preserved, even if that meant the placement of a small number of offenders in the community.18 Of
the dozens of political figures who were asked to assist the committee, only one person came forward: the local
district attorney. His steady support and involvement with the committee was important in getting the message
out to the various municipalities within the county that the 980 law was important to the long-term safety of
their communities.

The designees of elected officials on the committee were genuinely interested in fulfilling the charge of the
committee. During deliberations, the committee debated and discussed issues and came to consensus on how
to proceed.19 Where behaviors changed is when committee members were asked to make public statements
regarding committee work at the second public hearing. In one example, the director of behavioral health
services in the community worked very hard to realize the committee charge, but when the second public
hearing occurred he had to read a letter from his boss—the County Executive—that unequivocally spoke out
against the placement of any sex offenders in the community.
In addition, many public officials severely criticized the committee and its work at the second public hearing.
Some officials publicly pledged their assistance to the committee at the hearing, yet when the committee
actually requested this assistance it never materialized.

Lack of Resources
The sheer volume of e-mails, letters, phone calls, and other assorted materials received from the citizenry alone
required a major resource commitment. Four DHFS staff members conducted the background investigations of
the properties as well as provided all other administrative support to the committee. However, resources cannot
be limited to those provided administratively by one state agency. The committee, for example, required
assistance from realtors and other city, county, and state entities to find suitable locations, but did not have
support resources available to secure this assistance.

Vagueness of 2003 Act 187
Although providing many general criteria for the committee to consider when looking for locations in the
county, 2003 Act 187 included many criteria without specific definitions. In addition, some of the criteria were
internally contradictory, especially when the actual geography of Milwaukee County was closely scrutinized. In
addition, the Act did not include clear definition of terms that would have been useful in completing the
committee’s charge.
A key term, for example, that the committee struggled with in its deliberations was the word proximity. This
word is used in the statute in many places, specifically when considering locations and their distances from
sensitive areas such as facilities for children and residential subdivisions. The statute does not define this term
and so the term proximity had multiple meanings for all parties involved. Therefore, the committee adopted a
rule of 1,000 feet as a minimum distance that a location must be from these sensitive areas, defining the word
proximity in a very narrow way. This was done given the density of the county’s population and the large
number of sensitive locations that were close to one another. Some critics of the committee viewed the 1,000foot rule as too short a distance from sensitive locations.
Some of the criteria in the statute also conflicted. The criterion “accessibility to treatment for the persons living
in the facility,” for example, conflicted with the criterion of “proximity to sensitive locations.” In other words,
the areas in the county with the lowest population density, including the lowest density of children, were almost
always areas in where public transportation was extremely limited or nonexistent. Without clear direction in the
statute, the committee was left to interpret these criteria in a way that seemed reasonable given the uniqueness
and challenges found in the county to find locations.
Finally, the Act included language that allowed the committee to “consider” tax incentives to encourage
successful placement locations.20 This is a tool that would have been very helpful in finding a successful
placement; however, the committee did not have the power to produce or promise such tax incentives and it
was unclear exactly what was meant by including this phrase in the Act. Nor did the committee have the power
to move day care or school facilities that would be too close to otherwise viable locations, and neither DHFS nor

the committee had the power to condemn properties for the purpose of using them as potential locations to
house SVPs under supervised release.

Discussion
This account shows that many political officials and citizens were woefully uninformed regarding the purposes
and workings of the 980 law and the role this committee played in attempting to determine locations for the
housing of sexually violent offenders under supervision in the community. The largest stumbling block was the
fear and condemnation of integrating a class of offenders deemed SVPs into the community. The development
of a greater understanding among community members regarding the necessity of an enhanced supervision
process, stable housing and social support to reduce the recidivism of sexually violent offenders is necessary to
move forward. The supervision processes that were in place in the state worked very well and did significantly
reduce the risk of re-offending by offenders. A psychologist from DHFS gave this message to citizens at the
second public hearing. In fact, over the course of a 15-year period the state was very successful in placing
offenders and supervising them in the community (Watters, 2006).
Moreover, the citizenry was totally ignorant or indifferent to the consequences of not finding a house for this
class of sex offenders. In an erroneous fashion, many citizens and political leaders believed that if they did not
know about the problem and the issues of managing sexually violent offenders in the community it would
disappear. The committee could not hold such a view, understanding that a possible implication of not securing
a location in the county to house sexually violent offenders could be the striking down of the 980 law by a
court.21 This could have had the tragic result of releasing a large number of the highest risk sexually violent
offenders into the community without supervision and without the intensive treatment Chapter 980 offered. It
was suggested that such a scenario virtually guaranteed additional victims of sexual assault, who could
otherwise have been spared victimization if Chapter 980 remained in place.22 This horrific outcome, however,
has been questioned by some in the academic community as overstating the re-offense rates of sex offenders
(Langan & Levin, 2002).
In addition, any attempt to alter existing sentencing statutes in the state to enhance criminal penalties for the
commission of sexually violent offenses was, in the mind of the committee, of little value to the community. The
Supreme Court had already ruled that such enhancements for the group of extant offenders who had already
served their sentences were unconstitutional and in violation of the ex post facto clause of the U.S. Constitution
(La Fond, 2008), and as such would be of no value to either citizens attempting to promote greater safety in
their communities from SVPs, or improving the treatment options available to these offenders. Pursuing such a
strategy really would not address how communities across the state should manage sexually violent offenders
on release from prison.
Further legislative attempts at finding locations to house sexually violent offenders placed under supervised
release require a systematic plan for educating the public on the incidence and prevalence of sexual offending in
society, the process of civil commitment procedures under the 980 law and the differences between civil
commitment and criminal confinement, and the nature of supervision for those civilly committed under the 980
law. Other legislative acts to solve a housing placement problem should include more specific definitions
regarding the criteria for supervised release as well as tax incentives and/or resources available for purchasing
surrounding properties to effectuate a placement.23
Political involvement and support are essential if locations to house sexually violent offenders are to be found.
All 72 counties across the state had to address the issue of managing and supervising sexually violent offenders.
Each county had unique circumstances that made this issue difficult. Some counties across the state, however,
supervised sexually violent offenders very well. The committee found that in Milwaukee County, given its size

and dense population, trying to find locations to house SVPs under supervision was made difficult given, in part,
the statutorily defined criteria and other criteria used by the committee. Yet, having said this, there were still a
large number of locations for possible placement of the facility, notwithstanding the difficulties adopting the
criteria specified by statute and others created by the committee.
As the city of Milwaukee was large, it did have the benefit of having more possible locations to site the facility.
As noted earlier, there were more than 300 locations in the city that met the committee’s criteria. It was only
through long-term deliberations that 20 locations were chosen and a final 6 locations determined appropriate.
The final 6 locations were deemed by the committee to be the most suitable for placement of a facility. It is
likely that greater political involvement by local officials could have assisted the committee tremendously in
fulfilling its charge. But as documented earlier, instead, the committee faced stiff opposition from political
leaders, some of whom pandered to fear that justified a “NIMBY” (Not in My Back Yard) approach and further
inflamed the citizenry. This fear can only be overcome through a conscious political effort by the state and
counties working together to address this serious and emotionally laden issue. Because sincere political support
was not present, the committee’s efforts were thwarted, twisted, and often times misrepresented by extreme
positions, making its work much more difficult.
This raises the question of why there was such vitriolic opposition to the placement of a transitional house for
SVPs in the community. Despite the obvious claim that it may seem intuitive why communities are in opposition
to the placement of sexually violent offenders among them, it is not clear that even with such a highly
problematic population why they could not be managed in the community. Communities often times deal with
controversial issues. Why is this one so difficult to address? The answer may lie in the importance of political
leadership when it comes to confronting tough social and political issues facing a community.
As with many criminal justice efforts, successful ones are those that generate a broad base of political support
(see an excellent discussion of this topic by Stojkovic, Kalinich, & Klofas, 2012). As suggested earlier, political
leaders’ expressions of opposition to the placement of sexually violent offenders in the community were ironic
and strange. In the former case, political leaders and legislators voted to approve of legislation to augment the
980 statute with the 2003 Act 187 so that a house could be constructed in the Milwaukee community, yet when
it came to actually move forward on the project at the local level, reversed their support almost
unanimously.24 Why? A possible answer lies in the construct of political failure.
Political failure is a difficult concept to define and, as such, has no uniform definition (Percy, 2010). Yet, the
political science field has used the concept to describe when “market failure” occurs and political bodies have to
rectify a wrong that the market cannot adjust for in a reasonable way (Buchanan, 1988). We may say, for
example, the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 represents, at one level, the failure of many private
companies to control their product and assume responsibility for its potentially devastating impact on the
environment. The spillage and damage to communities caused by private actions or inactions are not only
resolved by the companies in question, that is, paying for the cleanup and compensating victims, persons and
businesses, for the spill. There is equally an expectation that the problem—the spill in this example—“could be
ideally corrected by politically directed adjustments in the rules guiding market participants” (Buchanan, 1988).
Yet what happens when the political solution is no solution at all, such in our case of attempting to find a house
for violent sex offenders, or when the political solution is perceived as a worse option among limited
alternatives by the community and ultimately rejected?
We then have failure at two levels, a private solution failure and a proposed government solution failure. Given
the degree to which the private sector, in this case property realtors, and the government sector as expressed
by this gubernatorial commission all failed, how are we to understand a way to generate a solution to the
problem of managing violent sex offenders in the community? Terry (2006) proposes that we improve the

management of sex offenders in the community through coordinated efforts among many private interests and
public interests.
One state, Texas, utilizes this approach in its outpatient civil commitment treatment program for SVPs. The
Council of Sex Offender Treatment is the foundation of the Texas program and consists of representatives of all
of the agencies that deal with sex offenders in the state (Meyer, Molet, Richards David, Arnold, & Latham,
2003). This coordinated approach is also implemented at the individual level, the SVP is managed with a
multidisciplinary team consisting of a case manager, treatment provider, a representative of the Department of
Public Safety (who provides GPS and EM monitoring), and other adjunct members (including a polygrapher,
psychologist, plethysmographer, and other mental health professionals; Taylor, 2003). The SVP is intensively
monitored and attends cognitive behavioral treatment. As housing for sex offenders in the community has also
been a problem in the Texas program, the Council will purchase an appropriate facility for the offender in the
community (Meyer et al., 2003). The appeal of the program is the cost savings (US$15,000-US$20,000 per SVP
per year in outpatient civil commitment as compared with US$80,000-US$125,000 per SVP per year in inpatient
civil commitment) and the protection of the community with electronic and GPS monitoring (Taylor, 2003).
Releasing sex offenders into the community through “Circles of Support and Accountability” (COSA) is another
means of enhancing the management of sex offenders in the community and reintegrating the “worst of the
worst” (Cesaroni, 2001). The COSA model consists of trained community volunteers who assist, support, and
hold sex offenders accountable for their actions (Wilson, Cortoni, & McWhinnie, 2009). For sex offenders to live
offense-free lives, informal social support is needed along with formal controls. The volunteers stay in contact
with the sex offender on a daily basis for the first 6 months and then weekly contacts and will help with
problems, such as finding housing and employment, as well as ensuring that risk factors are appropriately
managed (Braden et al., 2012). Recidivism data showed that 44 high risk sex offenders involved in COSA showed
an 83% reduction in sexual recidivism (defined as a charge or conviction for a new sexual offense) over a 35month follow-up period.
These strategies may have merit, but given the limited understanding that most ordinary people have regarding
sex offenders and ways to manage them it is not likely that such coordination is easy or possible. This statement
is true for ordinary citizens and those charged in the criminal justice system to manage this problem in the
community. This experience showed that public discourse never reached a level of adequacy when basic
fundamental issues were not addressed and understood, such as the highly variable nature of sex offending, the
differences between the civil commitment process and the criminal process, and what promising intervention
strategies exist to manage violent sex offenders in the community. These complicated issues are not so much
practical concerns as they are political issues.
This account highlighted how most political officials never took the time to educate themselves regarding the
issue of managing violent sex offenders in the community, never saw themselves as problem solvers as defined
by the 2003 Act 187, and sought to obstruct the committee that was trying to address an issue that was
extremely important to the community. In some cases, political sabotage even occurred and was practiced by
elected officials who had their own personnel and staff serving on the committee that was charged to find a
house for violent sex offenders in the county. This is why political leadership is so critical to successfully
managing violent sex offenders in the community. Without active political leadership to address citizen concerns
regarding public safety, the successful management of sex offenders in the community is not likely.
Finally, as evidenced in this account, political failure was a result of the unwillingness of political officials to
provide the leadership necessary to confront the problems and concerns of citizens when faced with a decision
to house sexually violent offenders in the community, especially as it related to their safety and security. At the
end of the day, no building to house sexually violent offenders in the community was found or built.25 No other

issue has raised the attention of politicians and citizen groups concerned with community safety more than how
best to manage sex offenders in the community (U.S. Department of Justice, 2009; Zgoba et al., 2009). While we
had sufficient practical knowledge to manage violent sex offenders in the community, in this account it was
revealed there was no political will to make it happen. Political leaders abdicated their responsibility to the
community, and by doing so failed and committed Milwaukee County to more practical and legal problems with
the implementation of the 980 statute, a clear example of political failure that continues to burden the
community today. Ironically, the 980 statute was created and justified as a way to enhance public safety, yet due
to changes in the law in reaction to the implementation of the 980 law and the resistance and unwillingness of
political leaders to assume responsibility for the problem, the community is now in the same position it was in
1994 before the law’s passage: many violent sex offenders in the community with limited treatment and no
supervision.
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Notes
1.The list of states with statutory provisions for the civil commitment of sex offenders includes Arizona,
California, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia,
Washington, and Wisconsin.
2.In Wisconsin, the impetus for the changed legislation was the placement of two violent sex offenders in
Milwaukee County without adequately discussing the placement with local elected officials and the
public. One offender was released from prison but had no place to stay and was being detained in a
secure sex offender treatment facility outside the county. He was very old and infirm. The other
offender was a repeat child molester whom the state had attempted to place in the community for a
number of years but failed on every attempt. The state finally did place the individual in the community
and he has been successful in his placement to this day.
3.State legislators who advocated for the Act 980 stated publicly that with the release of violent sex offenders
from prison communities were going to be terrorized. This piece of legislation was supposed to serve as
a form of protection for the community under the rubric of treatment, as the legislature was under the
impression that without the rationale of treatment, they could not withstand legal challenge.
Subsequent court decisions, at the State Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court (see La Fond, 2008,
for an interesting discussion of the ramifications of such a view and State of Wisconsin v. Schulpius, 270
Wis. 2d 427, 678, N.W. 2d 369, 2006), invalidated this rationale.
4.See State v. Laxton, 647, N.W. 2d 784 (2002) for a more thorough discussion of the constitutionality of the 980
statute as interpreted by the state supreme court. In addition, in Wisconsin v. Post, 197, Wis. 2d 279,
541 N.W. 2d 115 (1995), the state supreme court ruled that treatment in a secure facility “serves to
protect society and to treat the individual.”
5.Milwaukee had more than 500,000 residents in the city, with close to one million people in the county in 2004.
The city had a very diverse population, with African Americans making up 36% of the population,
followed by 13% Hispanic, 3% Asian, and 47% White (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). The outer ring and
suburbs were largely White. These demographics are still accurate in 2013.

6.The committee was composed of individuals consistent with statutory requirements, which required the
mayor, or designee, the sheriff or designee, the county executive or designee, the district attorney or
designee, and other assorted political and community members to serve on the committee.
7.In retrospect, the activities of the committee for the duration of its work proved to be immense. As one of the
authors was the chair of the committee, he had to take a balanced approach when interacting with
other committee members, elected officials, and the Milwaukee community. For the most part, this was
accomplished but it was a difficult process.
8.The Wisconsin State Supreme Court appointed a retired judge as Special Master on February 4, 2005 “to
monitor the progress of the siting committee charged with the responsibility of assisting the state in
determining the location for the facility enumerated in 2001 Act 16 & 9107 (1) (d) and to attend
committee meetings and . . . conduct such research and investigation as he deems appropriate and [to]
report back to this court on the progress and recommendations of the committee.”
9.The committee was acting blindly here. There was no empirical justification for setting the 1,000 foot
requirement, and in fact, empirical evidence suggests that distance parameters actually make no sense
(see Duwe, Donnay, & Tewksbury, 2008, for a discussion of this issue).
10.The committee’s initial determination of a list of properties for consideration revealed a large number of
potential properties. There were more than 300 properties examined across the county. The final list of
20 was arrived at through many hours of deliberation by the committee.
11.A motion was unanimously passed amending the definition of “viable” to include only those private
properties whose owners voluntarily agreed to submit their properties for consideration. The reason for
this motion was the certain knowledge that any private property owner would be subject to intense
publicity and public pressures, including negative responses from media, neighbors, and politicians.
Many committee members were concerned that private citizens were going to be harassed by other
citizens if their properties were up for consideration during committee deliberations. In addition, the
committee adopted an amendment to its criteria at its January 25, 2005, meeting stating that
governmental bodies could not choose to opt out and decide not to sell their properties to the state for
the purposes outlined in Act 187. A majority of committee members felt that this right was only
reserved for private property owners who could not withstand the potential fall-out and public pressure
once their properties were made public.
12.One government-owned property was located in a small city in the county and city planners stated “we don’t
know who owns the property, call the Mayor.” For two properties, presumably owned by the city, actual
ownership could never be determined. The two county-owned lands were “open for surplus,” according
to the Acting Director of the Economic and Community Development Division of the County, but the
decision on their sale was left up to the County Executive and the County Board, and “The Division is not
in the position of being able [to] either agree to their availability nor deny that availability.” Press
agencies and law firms sought through open records requests the list of property owners being
considered by the committee.
13.Of the original 12 properties, several properties were eliminated for the following reasons: 1 was designated
as unsuitable after a review of the initial property report, two property owners could not be contacted,
another property owner sought compensation for an additional 10 properties before he would consider
sale of the 1 property of interest, a trucking firm owned 1 property and believed it would be bought by
another trucking company, 1 property was going to be used by the current business to expand its
parking lot, one owner was seeking an asking price close to 4 times the budgeted amount for the
project, and one location was near a veterans’ hospital and not determined to be viable. Of the
remaining 12 properties, 2 were owned by the city, 2 by the county, and the remaining 8 by private
property owners.

14.The comment sheets had no substantive suggestions for the committee. All of the information was contact
information of speakers as required by committee rules.
15.Legislation passed in 2006 did allow for the placement of Sexually Violent Persons (SVPs) in other counties
other than their original home counties in the state. The problem that still remains is that these counties
did not want to receive SVPs from other counties. This led to small communities within counties across
the state passing ordinances prohibiting SVPs and other sex offenders from either residing in their
communities or only allowing them placement in certain pockets of the city.
16.Subsequent to the committee’s work and submission of the final report in July, 2005, the state has reported
that between 1994 and 2009, 79 persons were released on supervision pursuant to the 980 statute and
that not one had recidivated. Yet, the state also reported that 34 placements were returned to secure
confinement for rules violations while under supervision D. McCulloch (personal communication,
November 19, 2010). For the committee, this finding was also true and known during its deliberations
and was a measure of success, not failure, as it was evidence that the supervision practices in place were
efficacious and could be sustained.
17.The committee did vote on a measure to recommend that one of the authors draft a letter to be sent to the
state supreme court requesting a writ of mandamus, ordering the county to build a transitional facility in
the community. The measured failed by a vote of 14 in opposition and 1 in favor. One of the authors
was the lone dissenter and did write a separate letter that was placed in the committee’s final report
arguing for the court order. The court did not respond to this request, but a subsequent court action
(State of Wisconsin v. Schulpius, 270 Wis, 2d 427, 678 N.W. 2d 369 2006) denied a similar request by a
re-institutionalized offender. The state supreme court ruled that a local district court had the extant
authority to issue such an order, and as such, a request to the state’s highest court was not necessary or
appropriate.
18.The Department of Health and Family Services (DHFS) estimated that the number of offenders placed in the
community at any one time would be 9-12, with the emphasis of moving them ultimately to
independent living.
19.The committee recognized the possible negative consequences of having differing views being put out for
public consumption. The committee voted early in its deliberations to only allow the chair to speak on
behalf of the committee to the media and the public. The obvious reason was to have one voice
representing the committee, but in addition, many members viewed a singular voice as a way to shield
them from trouble with elected officials and constituent groups. In some cases, elected officials were
their immediate supervisors.
20.The 2003 Act 187 did provide for up to 1.3 million dollars for the construction of a transitional house or
renovation of an existing facility for sexually violent offenders in the community.
21.This was a fear expressed by many committee members during deliberations, yet in the end, the state
Supreme Court ended this concern by ruling that the construction of a “least restrictive environment”
(possibly a transitional house for sexually violent offenders) “did not make supervised release
indispensable to the constitutionality of Chapter 980 (State of Wisconsin v. Schulpius, 270 Wis. 2d 427,
678 N.W. 2d 369 2004).”
22.One author was always somewhat suspect of such a prediction, as it would be very difficult to determine how
many potential victims were spared due to the 980 law. Yet, the state has estimated they believe 425
violent sexual victimizations have been prevented due to the 980 law (McCulloch, 2010).
23.Since 2006, the state has been guided by new legislation that allowed local courts to petition other counties
in the state to house their sexually violent offenders and a change in the discharge criteria for release
that has led to a situation whereby offenders can now be released from the state’s treatment institution
without having to experience supervised release. In addition, the state created more stringent
supervised release criteria, making it more difficult to be in the community on such a program. Many

offenders discharged in 2010 and going forward will be very old and pose minimal threats to the
community (McCulloch, 2010).
24.It was noted during committee deliberations that there was no loss for up-state politicians to vote for a
measure that placed the burden of housing SVP’s in Milwaukee and not in other counties. Interestingly,
the record indicates that the two primary sponsors of the initial 980 legislation were from areas
adjacent to Milwaukee. Some committee members expressed the view that the legislation was designed
to make sure sex offenders in this community went back to their home communities and not spill over
into other communities.
25.To date, Milwaukee County never resolved the problem of transitional housing for sexually violent offenders.
With the liberalization of the discharge criteria and the tightening of the supervised release criteria, it is
likely that the county will see more offenders coming back with no supervision plans at all. It is quite
possible that after 19 years of living with the 980 law, the state will be back where it started, at least
with the state’s largest county: No supervised release program at all or a limited supervised release
program for those who meet very stringent criteria and some offenders simply discharged and not
required to receive any supervision or treatment to manage their sexually violent behaviors.

References
Adam Walsh Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act . (2006).
Braden, M., Gobbels, S., Willis, B., Ward, T., Costeletos, M., Mollica, J. (2012). Creating social capital and
reducing harm: Corrections Victoria support and awareness groups. Sexual Abuse in Australia and
New Zealand, 4(2), 36-42.
Buchanan, J. M. (1988, Spring/Summer). Market failure and political failure. Cato Journal, 8(1), 1-13.
Cesaroni, C. (2001). Releasing sex offenders into the community through “circles of support”—A means of
reintegrating the “worst of the worst.” Journal of Offender Rehabilitation, 34(2), 85-98.
Deming, A. (2008). Sexual offender civil commitment programs: Current practices, characteristics, and
resident demographics. Journal of Psychiatry & Law, 36, 439-461.
Duwe, G., Donnay, W., Tewksbury, R. (2008). Does residential proximity matter? A geographic analysis of sex
offense recidivism. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 35, 484-504.
Furby, L., Weinrott, M., Blackshaw, L. (1989). Sexual offender recidivism: A review. Psychological Bulletin,
105, 3-30.
Hanson, R. K., Bussiere, M. T. (1998). Predicting relapse: A meta-analysis of sex offender recidivism studies
(Research summary). Canadian Journal of Human Sexuality, 7(2), 161-162.
Hanson, R. K., Gordon, A., Harris, A. J., Marquez, J. K., Murphy, W., Quinsey, V. L., Setp, M. C. (2002). First
report of the collaborative outcome data project on the effectiveness of psychological treatment for
sex offenders. Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and Treatment, 14, 169-194.
Harris, D. A., Smallbone, S., Dennison, S., Knight, R. A. (2009). Specialization and versatility in sexual offenders
referred for civil commitment. Journal of Criminal Justice, 37, 37-44.
Lacoursiere, R. (2003). Evaluating offenders under a Sexually Violent Predator Law: The practical practice. In
Winnic, B. J., La Fond, J. Q. (Eds.), Protecting society from sexually dangerous offenders: Law, justice,
and therapy (pp. 75-97). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
La Fond, J. Q . (2008). Sexually violent predator laws and the liberal state: An ominous threat to individual
liberty. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 31, 158-171.
Langan, P. A., Levin, D. J. (2002). Recidivism of prisoners released in 1994. Washington, DC: U.S. Department
of justice, Bureau of justice statistics.
Levenson, J., Letourneau, E., Armstrong, K., Zgoba, K. M. (2010). Failure to register as a sex offender: Is it
associated with recidivism? Justice Quarterly, 27, 305-331.
McCulloch, D. (2010). Sand Ridge Secure Treatment Center Supervised Release Program. Judicial visitation
[PowerPoint presentation], Mauston, Wisconsin

Miethe, T., Olson, J., Mitchell, O. (2006). Specialization and persistence in the arrest histories of sex offenders:
A comparative analysis of alternative measures and offense types. Journal of Research in Crime &
Delinquency, 43, 204-229.
Meyer, W. J., Molett, M., Richards David, C., Arnold, L., Latham, J. (2003). Outpatient civil commitment in
Texas for management and treatment of sexually violent predators: A preliminary report.
International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 47, 396-406.
Nunnally, D., Johnson, A. (2005, March 8). Short list for sex offender home. Communities quickly object to
proposals. Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 3-5.
Palermo, G. B., Farkas, M. A. (2001). The dilemma of the sexual predator. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas
Publisher.
Percy, S. (2010). Conversation with Professor Steven Percy. Political Science Department, University of
Wisconsin–Milwaukee, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
Sample, L. L., Bray, T. M. (2003). Are sex offenders different? An examination of rearrest patterns? Criminal
Justice Policy Review, 17. 83-102.
Simon, L. (2000). An examination of the assumptions of specialization, mental disorder and dangerousness in
sex offenders. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 18, 275-308.
Stojkovic, S., Kalinich, D., Klofas, J. (2012). Criminal justice organizations: Administration and management
(5th ed.). Belmont, CA: Thomson/Wadsworth Publishing Company.
Taylor, A. (2003, September/October). Civil commitments of sexually violent predators. Civil Law Update, 3639.
Terry, K. (2006). Sexual offenses and offenders: Theory, practice, and policy. Belmont,
CA: Thomson/Wadsworth Publishing Company.
Terry, K. (2007). Sex offenders and sexual victimization: Editorial introduction. Criminology, 6, 503-506.
Tewksbury, R., Lees, M. (2006). Consequences of sex offender registration. Journal of Contemporary Criminal
Justice, 21, 67-82.
U.S. Census Bureau . (2010). Milwaukee City, Wisconsin statistics and demographics. Washington, D.C.
U.S. Department of Justice . (2009). Residency requirements: What’s geography got to do with it? Geography
& Public Safety, 2(1), 1-16.
Watters, S. (2006). Wisconsin’s sexually violent persons law: Chapter 980 overview [PowerPoint
presentation], Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
Watters, S. (2009). Wisconsin’s sexually violent persons law: Chapter 980 overview [PowerPoint
presentation], Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
Wilson, R. J., Cortoni, McWhinnie, A. J. F. (2009). Circles of support & accountability: A Canadian National
replication of outcome findings. Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and Treatment, 21, 412-430.
Winick, B. J. (2003). A therapeutic jurisprudence assessment of sexually violent predator laws. In Winnic, B. J.,
La Fond, J. Q. (Eds.), Protecting society from sexually dangerous offenders: Law, justice, and therapy
(pp. 317-331). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Wisconsin 2003 Act 187 . (2003). Renumbering chapter 980 (Sexually Violent Person Commitments
Law). Wisconsin state legislature.
Zevitz, R., Farkas, M. A. (2000). Sex offender community notification: Examining the importance of
neighborhood meetings. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 18, 393-408.
Zgoba, K. M. A., Levenson, J. S., McKee, T. (2009). Examining the impact of sex offender restrictions on
housing availability. Criminal Justice Policy Review, 20, 91-110.

